STOP THE BOMB criticizes Western naiveté in face of Iran’s strategic deception and delay tactics before the nuclear talks in Moscow
STOP THE BOMB press release, June 17, 2012
With appendix: How Iran enriches uranium for seven bombs and takes further steps towards the bomb
The third round of the latest nuclear talks between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 group will take place next Monday and Tuesday in Moscow. Until now, the talks follow a well-known dramaturgy: After “very constructive” talks in a “positive atmosphere” at the first round in Istanbul in April (1) now suddenly “difficulties” arise. (2)
STOP THE BOMB spokesperson Jonathan Weckerle comments: „The Iranian regime again succeeded in winning precious time for its nuclear program without giving anything in return. In face of the foreseeable Iranian tactical maneuvers at the talks in Moscow, it is now crucial to let the decided European oil sanctions really come into effect on the beginning of July, and not to delay or water them just because of some vague promises by the regime. The fatal combination of Western naiveté and Iranian negotiations skills has only brought the regime closer to the bomb.”
The goal of the Iranian regime is the watering of the sanctions, reported the New York Times with reference to Iranian officials in the middle of May. (3)
Typical for the Iranian negotiating tactic and Western credulity is a recent Financial Times Germany interview with the Iranian ambassador in Germany, the Revolutionary Guards man (4) Ali Reza Sheikh Attar, who under the headline “Iran’s U-turn in the nuclear conflict” was quoted on the FTD front page saying that Iran was ready to give up enriching uranium to 20%. Only a short time later, the Iranian embassy denied this statement in Persian, but the German press did not pick this up. (5) In case Iran should promise to give up 20% enrichment, this would probably remain only empty words.
Hardly noticed, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle had a personal meeting with his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Salehi at the Afghanistan conference in Kabul. (6) According to Der Spiegel Westerwelle wanted to talk with Salehi about Syria (7), and win the Islamic Republic as a partner for conflict solution. (8) This again looks like a dangerously wrong assessment of the Iranian role: The regime is not interested in a peaceful solution in Syria. It wants to maintain its own influence there in case Assad will not be able to stay in power, despite the massive Iranian support for the Syrian dictator. The same is true for Afghanistan, where the Iranian goal is not “stability”, but the increase of its own influence, according to reports especially in the important education sector. Instead of warning against the problematic Iranian influence in Afghanistan (10), Westerwelle “explicitly welcomed” Salehi’s participation by simply arguing that Iran is a neighboring country. (11) “The role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Syria and Afghanistan is not ‘constructive’, but diametrically opposed to a positive development in these countries. It is to be feared that the regime will successfully use this as a bargaining chip at the nuclear talks”, concludes Weckerle.
Appendix: How Iran enriches uranium for seven bombs and takes further steps towards the nuclear bomb
Since then, the Islamic Republic systematically continued its nuclear program, including uranium enrichment, and violated the UN resolutions and the Non-Proliferation Treaty:
-According to IAEA estimations, the Islamic Republic began in 2006 with secretly building the underground enrichment facility in Fordow. The facility was uncovered in September 2009 by Western intelligence. Uranium is enriched there to nearly 20%. Recently, the IAEA found traces of uranium enriched to 27%. (14)
-According to information of the long-time former IAEA chief inspector Olli Heinonen Iran has now six tons of uranium enriched to 3.5%. This means 75% of the effort to get the 90% enriched uranium needed for nuclear weapons. Additionally the regime now has 150 kg of 20% enriched uranium, meaning 90% of the effort for weapons grade enrichment. The expert estimates that Iran will have enough enriched material for the production of seven nuclear bombs at the end of the year. He stressed that Iran has improved its enrichment capabilities and that a breakout towards high enrichment probably could only be discovered after several months. (15)
-There are increasing signs in recent time that Iran is undertaking further steps besides enrichment to get a nuclear weapons capacity. The “National Council of Resistance of Iran” provided extensive documents in May 2012 that should prove intensive work on a nuclear warhead. (16) In May 2012 a graphic, which experts rated as authentic, reinforced IAEA suspicions of a test chamber for explosive devices at the military facility in Parchin. (17) Iran until now refuses to give plausible explanations and inspection of the facility. Satellite images show that extensive cleaning and demolition works were done in Parchin, possibly to destroy evidence. (18) In the state controlled Iranian media texts appear that openly discuss the need for nuclear weapons. (19) Otherwise, the alleged fatwa by Khamenei that allegedly condemns the possession of nuclear weapons does not appear in Khamenei’s written collections of fatwas and its authenticity is questioned by many experts. (20)
